The overview said “the form of a language is the constant way it turns thought into sound.” An abstract phrase. What does it point to concretely? Here Humboldt’s “form (Form)” is unpicked from the German.

1. Material (Stoff) and form (Form)

material (Stoff) = common to humankind · the voice-making body (the organs of speech) · the whole of what can be thought form (Form) = differs by language · how sound is divided and combined · how concepts are made and related = not a heap of isolated facts, but a consistent "method"
The material is common. The "method" that organises it is the form, and it differs from language to language. Diagram: L/LAB

Every language has a material (Stoff) common to all: the voice-making body, and the world of what can be thought. But how that material is organised differs by language, and this organising is the form (Form). Humboldt is emphatic that form is not an assemblage of small rules: no particular may enter the concept of the form of a language “as an isolated fact, but only in so far as a method of language-formation (eine Methode der Sprachbildung) can be discovered in it” (German quotations throughout; Japanese and English are L/LAB working translations).

So “English has third-person-singular -s” is not, by itself, form. Only when you can read off from it how English chooses to lock subject and predicate together does it become a matter of form.

2. Outer form and inner form

outer form (Lautform) = sound system, word shape, word order inner (language) form = how concepts are made, which grammatical categories are set up, how relations are drawn (= how thought is articulated) the term "inner form of language (innere Sprachform)" was tidied up later by Steinthal
The layer of sound (outer form) and, beneath it, the layer that organises concepts (inner form). Humboldt's interest is chiefly the latter. Diagram: L/LAB

Humboldt’s “form” has two faces. Outer form (Lautform) — the sound system, the shape of words, word order. And, working beneath it, an inner form — how concepts are made, which grammatical categories (tense, number, case, voice…) are set up, how word is related to word, where the continuum of thought is cut into segments. When Humboldt says “this differs by language,” he chiefly means this inner face. Hyman Steinthal later tidied it into one term: the “inner form of language (innere Sprachform).”

3. A language presents not “objects” but “ways of grasping objects”

elephant "drinks twice" (trunk and mouth) → word A "the two-tusked one" → word B "the one with a hand" (trunk as hand) → word C One object. But a different feature seized = a different concept = a different word.
The three Sanskrit words for "elephant." A word denotes not the object itself but the concept the mind forms about it. Diagram: L/LAB

Humboldt’s famous example.

When in Sanskrit the elephant is called now “the twice-drinking,” now “the two-tusked,” now “the one furnished with a hand,” Humboldt notes, “so many different concepts are thereby designated, even though the same object is always meant.” His reason:

Denn die Sprache stellt niemals die Gegenstände, sondern immer die durch den Geist in der Spracherzeugung selbstthätig von ihnen gebildeten Begriffe dar.

For language never presents the objects, but always the concepts formed from them, actively, by the mind in the generation of language.

A word is not a label stuck on an object. A word fixes how the mind grasped the object. “The twice-drinker” and “the two-tusked one” may look like synonyms in a dictionary; at the level of inner form they are different concepts.

4. Hence, in translation, the “form” slips

Same object, different grasp — this becomes conspicuous across languages. English home and house; the range Japanese ao covers (traffic lights, young leaves, the sea); how kinship is cut (English brother vs Japanese “elder brother / younger brother”). The referents overlap, but because the inner form differs, they do not carry the same value. Translation is hard not for want of vocabulary but because the way concepts are cut — the form — does not line up. Humboldt carries this into the theme of the next piece, worldview.

5. To Saussure, Sapir, Weisgerber

the continuum of thought (no divisions of its own) language A's cut language B's cut (in different places)
The continuum has no divisions of its own. Where you cut is "form." This is the same thought as Saussure's "sheet of paper." Diagram: L/LAB

In sum

Humboldt’s claimrestated
Material (voice, the thinkable) is common; form is language-specificnot what you have, but how you organise it, divides languages
Form is not an isolated fact but a consistent “method”not “there is an -s” but “how subject and predicate are locked together”
Inner form = how concepts, categories and relations are made“inner form of language” is Steinthal’s coinage
A word presents not an object but “a way of grasping” it (a concept)the three Sanskrit words for “elephant”
→ Saussure’s value, Sapir’s form/function, Weisgerber’s intermediate world“where you cut the continuum” is form

Why it is still read

The Humboldt feature: overview / energeia / this essay / worldview / infinite use of finite means / the organ of thought, and dialogue / typology and ranking.